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Disagreement Game

What happens if no new evidence is collected, i.e. the payments are as shown in Table 4? Then the Nash balances of the game depend on the value “(u_s) ” to be in a suspension state, in addition to the p and q values. This is used for a number of values of . (u_s) in Figure 4. Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and disagreement. No. 41 (3), 478-502. There are a lot of Nash balances in Nash`s demand game.

Every x and y, so that x and z is a Nash balance. If one of the players increases his demand, both players receive nothing. If their demand decreases, they receive less than if they had asked x or y. There is also a Nash balance where both players ask for all the good. Here, both players receive nothing, but neither player can increase their performance by changing strategy unilaterally. What are Nash balances of the peer-reviewed version of the dissent game with a single round whose withdrawals are shown in Table 3, that is, the version in which detectives collect new evidence when they suspend the verdict (so the value of the suspension does not matter)? It always depends on the values of p and q, as shown in Figure 3. The fact that, among these strategies, the game continues forever does not make it impossible to evaluate the rationality of these strategies. Indeed, in both cases, we can still assess the well-being of these strategies in terms of monitoring the truth. (AN) determines the preferences of detectives in relation to the results of the game of disagreement: Jane prefers a result in which she has a real faith in the guilt of the butler, a person in whom she has a false faith, and also for Hercules.Footnote 12 A detective gets utility 1 if his faith in the guilt or innocence of the butler at the end of the opinion game is true , and utility 0, if that`s not true.

Footnote 13 The first entry of “Mathbf” is the probability of ending the game in the absorbent state where the two detectives have true faith, and the second entry is the probability that the two detectives end up with a false faith. Footnote 21 Therefore, the payment (expected) to Jane and Hercules is on the profile (suspended, suspended) We assume that Jane and Hercules share this noble goal, and that, in fact, getting a true belief as to whether the butler did so is their only goal. Footnote 11 Thus, the two detectives are not distracted by pragmatic concerns. This is a methodological hypothesis rather than a substantive hypothesis: we are interested in cognitive theory of disagreements with peers, not their pragmatism. Second, the rationality of responding to the disagreements of their peers may depend on the delicacy of the truth of their peers. Both the sensitivity to peer truth (who has a better record and how much?) and their absolute sensitivity to truth (are they better than chance, say, or another objective threshold?) can make a difference. First, it is important to distinguish between their peers in cases of quantitative and qualitative differences. In the quantitative case, agents assign different degrees of faith to a sentence, while the qualitative case concerns full states of faith (faith, increduation and suspension of judgment). Some have argued that the quantitative model of epenic means should be considered fundamental and that the qualitative model should be reduced to this one (Lin and Kelly 2012; Leitgeb 2014). Others have argued otherwise (Easwaran comes).

This debate is not resolved. As a result, we can treat cases of quantitative and qualitative divergences with our peers as separate problems. In this paper, we focus on the case of quality. However, as most of the work in formal knowledge theory, which is relevant to the differences of opinion of its peers, focuses on the quantitative case, we first discuss this work. In the trading game of Rubinstein`s offer,[4] players alternately act as surplus share seekers.