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Executive Agreement

Five years later, in the “Usa” / 494 cases, the Court adopted these principles another case concerning the attribution and recognition of the Soviet government by Litvinov. The question was whether the United States had the right to recover the assets of the New York branch of a Russian insurance company. The company argued that the Soviet government`s forfeiture decrees did not apply to its property in New York and could not apply in contradiction to the U.S. and New York Constitutions. The court, which was decided by Justice Douglas, brushed aside these arguments. An official statement from the Russian government itself resolved the issue of the extraterritorial operation of the Russian nationalization decree and was binding on the US courts. The power to remove such barriers to full recognition of the rights of our nationals is “a modest tacit power of the president, who is “the only organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.” It was the verdict of the political department that the full recognition of the Soviet government required the resolution of outstanding problems, including the claims of our nationals . . . . .

We would take over the executive function if we felt that the court decision was not final and conclusive. . . . Zschernig had been asleep for some time and, although it was recently examined by the Court of Justice, it remains the only holding company in which the Court has used dormant foreign policy power to make state law too low. In the 1990s, there was renewed academic interest in Zschernig, when some national and local governments sought ways to express dissatisfaction with foreign governments` human rights policy or to restrict trade with non-favoured countries.20 Christmas Signs. B, Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 341 (1999) ; Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Whither Zschernig?, 46 Vill. L. Rev.

1259 (2001); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1617 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1223 (1999). See also Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 149-69 (2d ed. 1996).

In 1999, the court repealed the Massachusetts Burmese Sanctions Act on the basis of the legal pre-emption situation and refused to consider the alternative holding of the Court of Appeal used by Zschernig.21Foot-Crosby/National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000). For the application of the Zschernig Court of Appeal, see National Council of Foreign Trade v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 49:61 (1st cir. 1999). Similarly, in 2003, the court found that the California Victim Insurance Relief Act had been anticipated as an interference with the foreign policy of the Confederation, which is reflected in the executive agreements, and although the court had discussed Zschernig at length, it did not consider it necessary to resolve issues related to its scope22Foot-NoteAmerican Ins. Ass`n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. to 419-n.11 (2003).

In the case of executive agreements, it seems generally accepted that the president, if he has the independent power to enter into an executive agreement, can denounce the agreement independently, without the approval of Congress or the Senate. 187 The same principle would apply to political commitments: to the extent that the President is empowered to make non-binding commitments without the consent of the Senate or Congress, the President may also unilaterally resign from those commitments.188 The United States Constitution does not explicitly give a president the power to enter into executive agreements.